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Situating Climate Security 
The Department of Defense’s Role in Mitigating Climate Change’s 
Causes and Dealing with its Effects 
Daniel Clausen and Michael Clausen 
An Emerging Security Focus: Climate Security 
A new concern is circulating among policymakers, think tanks, and scholars: securing the 
planet’s climate. For those who debate what counts as “national security,” the question over 
whether climate change should be framed as a security issue has been argued along well-worn 
lines. For those who seek a more expansive definition of security, one that reaches beyond 
military threats, the threat of climate change is another reason why the lines of security need to 
be re-drawn. For those who see the inclusion of climate change as a threat to the notion of 
security as the protection of the state in a competitive international system, widening the term to 
encompass climate change threatens to draw attention away from traditional threats (future peer 
competitors like China and a resurgent Russia) and the “new nontraditional” threats (rogue states 
and transnational terrorism). At the most basic level, the inclusion of environmental threats in a 
security paradigm risks confusing national security with foreign policy and global politics. As 
this article will show, however, in many ways this debate has already become obsolete. Since the 
issuance of the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates, the 
publication of a bevy of key reports by respected think tanks, and most recently the latest 
Defense Department Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Security Strategy 
(NSS), climate security has increasingly become recognized as a legitimate object of national 
security thinking.[1]  
In this essay we will examine three issues: the emerging threat of climate change as it is 
currently known through climate change models, the way climate security is increasingly being 
internalized in the U.S. national security community, and the tasks the DoD can undertake to 
mitigate the causes of climate change and deal with its effects. We will mostly draw on the 
wealth of research done by academics, think tanks, and government officials since the issuance 
of the IPCC 2007 synthesis report—most prominently the 2010 Department of Defense QDR. In 
addition to these influential reports,[2] our analysis will also use concepts developed by the 
Copenhagen School of “securitization studies.”[3] This approach offers important insights into 
how and why issues move beyond normal politics to become vital issues of security. The key 
insight of the Copenhagen School is that there is no externally valid definition for “security” or 
“national security,” but rather, that the meanings of these terms are always defined through the 
interactions politicians, external contexts, and audiences who support definitions of security. In a 
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somewhat paradoxical sense, while the struggle over the meaning of “security” is political, the 
reason the status of the “security” label is sought is because it takes issues beyond the fray of 
normal politics. The label of “security” is an important political asset because it raises an issue 
above normal debates and gives the issue an aura of unquestioned priority.   
Unlike other security issues that are largely defined and debated within well-known national 
security institutions, to date the threat of climate change has primarily been defined by an 
epistemic community outside of the national security community. This epistemic community’s 
concern has typically been global, not national. For this reason, climate security has frequently 
been framed as an international political problem—one that requires bargaining, institution-
building, and information-sharing, not the support of the military. That being said, the problem 
has gained and should continue to gain credibility as a security issue for a number of important 
reasons. The first is that framing climate change as a security concern elevates the issue above 
normal political conversations. Given current knowledge of the threat of climate change to global 
political stability, the issue clearly warrants increased attention. The second reason is that 
because the effects of climate change threatens to intensify many of the issues the defense 
community currently deals with, planners will need to become increasingly aware of the deep 
connections between environmental breakdowns, political institutions, and potential threats. The 
third reason is that the military has an important role to play in mitigating the causes of climate 
change. As the Department of Defense (DoD) increases its cooperation with other agencies on 
research and development, works to develop a more energy efficient fighting force, and lowers 
its carbon footprint at bases around the world, it will also play an important role in driving 
technological innovation that could help stop the environmental pollution that fuels climate 
change.  
This paper will begin by recounting how climate change has evolved as an object of national 
security thinking and discourse, beginning from the 1980s and stretching to the current 
“Climategate” issue. It will then examine the research climate change scientists and national 
security-oriented think tanks have done in terms of formulating plausible scenarios with a special 
focus on the way climate change has been defined as a “threat multiplier.” The paper will then 
examine the role the DoD can play in mitigating the causes of climate change. In addition to 
building the intellectual framework for understanding the three points outlined above, this paper 
will also attempt to leave the reader with an appreciation of the tensions between climate change 
as a security issue (an issue worthy of being elevated as a national priority) and climate change 
as an issue for military planners in the DoD.    
The Rise of Climate Change as an Object of National Security 
Since the 1980s, the issue of climate change has been on and off the political agenda—to say 
nothing of its framing as a national security issue. After James Hansen (then director of NASA’s 
Goddard Institute of Space Studies) famously asserted in 1988 that climate change was near 
certain,[4] speculation and research began on the linkages between national security, climate 
change, and environmental degradation. That same year the IPCC was created under the 
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guidance of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) and World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) to represent the consensus of scientists on the issue of climate change. It wasn’t until the 
1990s, however, that the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) 
was created within the DoD to address issues of environmental concern. This corresponded with 
a gradual rise in policy statements placing the environment and environmental degradation 
within the sphere of national security. The 1991 National Security Strategy features a brief 
section on the environment that mentions issues of food security, ozone depletion, water supply, 
deforestation, biodiversity and treatment of wastes, in addition to the problem of climate 
change.[5] In addition, a Global Environmental Affairs Directorate at the National Security 
Council and an Office of Environmental Security led by a Deputy Undersecretary of Defense 
were established to address the rising interest in the connections between the environment and 
security. Around this same time, the idea that environmental scarcity could fuel a future anarchy 
of ungovernable spaces was first elaborated in the scholarship of Thomas Homer-Dixon and then 
popularized by Robert Kaplan in his famous 1994 article for the Atlantic Monthly,[6] an article 
that was widely circulated among policymakers. This popular speculation would lead to the 
creation of the new subfield of environmental security and a flurry of new initiatives for securing 
the environment within the Clinton administration. Thus, the 1997 National Security Strategy 
reflected Kaplan’s concerns of resource scarcity fueling an increasing number of post-modern 
conflicts.[7]   
Despite a growing awareness of climate change, the issue remained largely neglected. The Kyoto 
Protocol of 1997, though signed by the United States, was never sent to the Senate for 
ratification. Bipartisan resistance to the protocol centered on its failure to address pollution from 
rising industrial powers like China and India. While the Pentagon did commission one report in 
2003 that garnered some media attention, the issue remained largely undervalued as a national 
security priority.[8] Even though interest was growing in some circles of the defense community 
about the linkages between environmental degradation and conflict, without national leadership 
these projects remained largely on the backburner. As the national security community dealt first 
with the immediate threat of Al Qaeda and addressing gaps in homeland security, then wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and then rising nuclear threats from Iran and North Korea, the issue of 
climate change was neglected both as a political issue and as a security concern.  
Since 2007, however, there has been a dramatic rise in the attention paid to climate change both 
as an international political issue and as a mounting security threat. That year both Al Gore and 
the IPCC won the Nobel Peace Prize for their work in raising awareness of the issue. The IPCC’s 
2007 synthesis report judged that the evidence for climate change is “unequivocal”[9] and that 
the evidence that human generated greenhouse gases are the cause of increased temperatures is 
“very likely” (over 90 percent).[10] That year also saw the issuance of an influential report by 
the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) backed by retired generals framing climate change as 
“threat multiplier.”[11] In addition, the Triangle Institute for Security Studies hosted a 
conference that addressed the impacts of climate change on national security.[12] Following 
these influential reports, several other studies and volumes were published, along with a National 
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Intelligence Assessment[13] issued by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  
Most importantly, the notion of climate change as a security issue has now captured the attention 
of political and military senior leadership. Whereas the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review made 
no mention of climate change or environmental security, the DoD 2008 National Defense 
Strategy acknowledged both that “climate pressures may generate new security challenges” and 
the need to “tackle climate change.”[14] Riding this new wave of engagement with the issue of 
climate change, the latest 2010 DoD QDR and NSS devote entire sections to the subject. The 
QDR addresses the full range of effects that climate change is likely to have on the security 
environment, and what needs to be done to tailor future force structure, mitigate the DoD’s 
carbon footprint, and help spur new technological developments in clean energy;[15] the NSS 
meanwhile emphasizes the risk climate change poses to national security and the need for a 
broad shift toward an energy efficient economy. As the 2010 NSS states: “The danger from 
climate change is real, urgent, and severe.”[16] 
The “Climategate” incident of winter 2009, where over a thousand emails and other documents 
were made public through a server breach of the University of East Anglia’s Climate Research 
Unit (CRU), has served as a major publicity blow to those hoping to establish a wider consensus 
on combating climate change. Even though the incident has done little to undermine the 
scientific consensus on the reality of anthropogenic climate change, the scandal has done much 
to undermine public confidence in climate change science, and thus, undermine the U.S. 
domestic consensus for pursuing robust policies to lower greenhouse gasses. An independent 
committee set up by the University of East Anglia has largely exonerated the beleaguered CRU 
and its director, though it has noted that the unit should be more open in the future.[17] The 
longer term concern is that incidents like “Climategate” will continue to foster a siege mentality 
within the scientific community that encourages scientists to guard data and restrict openness. 
These practices would only continue to feed conspiratorial attitudes toward the scientific 
community engaged in climate change research.  
Estimates, Scenarios, and the Special Role of the Scientific Epistemic Community 
It is not an insignificant point that many of the recent reports and scholarship that connect 
climate change to national security point to climate change’s already perceptible influences—
from the increased likelihood of hurricanes, to the spread of desertification in parts of Africa, to 
increased tension over scarce water resources in the Darfur region of the Sudan. As Buzan, 
Waever, and de Wilde write about past attempts to frame environmental issues as security 
threats: “Environmental issues often point to an unspecified, relatively remote future and 
therefore involve no panic politics.”[18] The vagueness of environmental predictions often 
conflicts with a national security culture that privileges threats that are certain, proximate, and 
grounded in an understanding of the international system as a competition among states.  
While most reports on climate change note the ambiguity involved in modeling environmental 
systems, the consensus among scientists is that not only is climate change verifiable, but 
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predictions up until this point have been too conservative. Because of the ambiguities involved in 
modeling environmental systems, one group of scholars (a combination of former government 
officials and Brookings Institute, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Center for Naval 
Analyses, and Center for New American Security scholars) has purposely used the word 
scenarios rather than prediction to describe their approach.[19] These authors argue that because 
climate change involves a complex relationship of interlinked variables that are difficult to 
predict—demography, energy policy, technological change, and their interactions with complex 
ecological systems—one should not dwell on the most likely scenario, but rather, examine a 
range of plausible ones. This logic applies not only to rate of climate change but also to its 
effects. As many scholars have pointed out, the linkages among environmental stress, 
environmental shocks, and trends such as political violence, migration, and the spread of disease 
are difficult to theorize with precision.[20]  
Currently, the average obtained from IPCC climate change scenarios projects that over the next 
twenty to thirty years the earth’s average temperature will rise by 1.3 degrees Celsius. This 
scenario assumes that there are no trigger effects or feedback loops, and thus, extrapolates 
largely from trends known to date.[21] While the geographical impact of climate change will 
vary, in the next twenty to thirty years vulnerable regions will face prospective food shortages, 
droughts, and flooding. Among the possible implications of these environmental changes will be 
pandemics, political instabilities, and potential energy and food shocks. These ecologically-
induced crises could destabilize entire regions, feeding terrorist movements and sparking 
interstate and civil conflicts. What is significant about this scenario is that it has been described 
as inevitable.[22] Though climate change may bring some benefits to the United States in the 
form of near term increases in agricultural yields,[23] these benefits will be offset by irregular 
weather patterns and political and economic losses from the failure of poorer countries to cope 
with climate change. 
Another plausible scenario, explored by Leon Fuerth,[24] assumes that various tipping points 
and feedback loops are activated, and thus, that the earth’s climate increase more rapidly. In this 
scenario, methane released from melted ice sheets, the decline in carbon absorbing forestry, and 
the rate of rapid industrialization lead to double the climate change increase predicted in the first 
scenario—temperatures increase over the next twenty years by 2.6 degrees Celsius instead of the 
expected 1.3 degrees. Water scarcities increase, crop yields decline rapidly, coastal regions are 
subject to drastic flooding, and global fisheries decline as a result of coral bleaching and ocean 
acidification.[25] These multiple ecological breakdowns strain political institutions (especially in 
the less developed world), leading to mass migration, intra and interstate conflict, and possibly 
the resurgence of virulent fascist ideologies.[26] As many scholars have stressed, however, 
because of the many complex systems involved in predicting these events—both ecological and 
political—speculation on the consequences of abrupt climate change are at best useful stories for 
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Seeing Climate Change through its Effects: Climate Change as a “Threat Multiplier”  
Currently, much of the national security literature designates climate change as a “threat 
multiplier.”[28] The idea is that climate change’s impact on ecosystems will cause critical food 
and water shortages, spur mass migration, and strain governments’ capacities and credibility, 
thus leading to more conflict and anarchy—especially in those countries that lack the resources 
to deal with these effects. According to this research, the first victims will likely be states that 
lack reserve capacities in capital, scientists, engineers, or flexible political institutions able to 
adjust to the effects of climate change.[29] This is not to reinforce stereotypes of the poor in the 
Global South as the inevitable seed of world anarchy--to suggest as much would in any case 
ignore the source of much carbon pollution.[30] Though there is currently a wealth of research 
challenging these neo-Malthusian assumptions of easy connections between environmental 
scarcities and violent conflict,[31] the saliency of the environment-conflict linkage will likely 
increase as the severity of environmental shocks increases. As current environmental security 
thinking suggests: because of this threat of expanded ungovernable spaces, the United States will 
need to continue to secure U.S. energy supplies, most likely through increased stability 
operations in unstable areas of the world where energy is abundant, and expand capabilities for 
guarding sea lanes in newly opened up areas of the Arctic Ocean.[32]    
Analysts who examine the threat of climate change to U.S. security often point out that potential 
ecological catastrophes threaten the “resilience of the international community,”[33] creating 
dangerous imbalances between nations that have the capacity to deal with climate change and 
those that do not. While some might quibble that some of this language conflates global justice 
with the United States’ vital security interests, the connection is analytically useful for a number 
of reasons. As weak states become afflicted by environmental stresses, the United States will 
have to face the possibility of a rapid surge in migration, the spread of pandemics, and the 
breakdown of political stability in energy rich countries and countries that are becoming 
increasingly embedded in the global economy, thus affecting the economic security of U.S. 
citizens.  
There is a growing consensus that the impact of climate change will continue to strain the United 
States’ credibility as a global security provider, peace broker, and disaster relief provider. As the 
United States and other countries try to attenuate the impact of climate change on their own soil, 
security scholars are worried that the United States and the world will lose established levels of 
international cooperation—the current state of the international community as such. This loss of 
cooperation could affect U.S. efforts to uproot terrorism, stop nuclear proliferation, and confront 
rogue regimes. Because the United States is the per capita leader in greenhouse gas emissions, 
the United States may also be seen as a legitimate target for groups that are most affected by 
climate change, thus intensifying terrorist recruitment. In addition, these threats need not come 
from transnational groups subject to U.S. border patrol and other surveillance techniques. 
Instead, threats to U.S. economic infrastructure could come from “homegrown” eco-terrorist 
groups who see U.S. pollution as the ultimate threat to Gaea.[34]    
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Though accurate and analytically useful, the term “threat multiplier” could also lead to some 
dangerous gaps in understanding how to respond to climate change. The idea of climate change 
as a threat multiplier leads the defense community to focus more on responding to the outcome 
of climate change (an intensified environment of threats defined in the usual terms of disaster 
relief, increased terrorism, rogue and collapsed states) than attenuating its causes—greenhouse 
gas emissions.[35] As the current QDR illustrates, however, the DoD has taken proactive steps 
toward lowering its carbon footprint and establishing programs that spur important technological 
developments in energy efficiency and alternative fuels. 
The Case for Prevention—The DoD’s Role in Mitigating the Causes of Climate Change 
The DoD is currently the single largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the United States. In 2007, 
the DoD spent some $12.6 billion on petroleum, consuming some 395,000 barrels of oil or about 
as much as the total consumption of Greece.[36] Because current economic models suggest that 
the opportunity to mitigate the worst impacts of climate change cheaply is declining 
drastically,[37] it is essential that the DoD continue to make strides toward becoming more 
energy efficient. In this regard, the U.S. military has been proactive in promoting energy efficient 
technologies, eliminating waste at major facilities,[38] recovering waste that has renewable 
energy content,[39] increasing the amount of solar technology it uses on buildings and 
equipment, employing smart grid technology, and integrating renewable energy sources and 
hybrid energy sources into energy plans.[40] While these strategies are commendable, recent 
reports argue that the defense community should attempt to reduce energy consumption by 
twenty percent by the year 2025.[41] Greater energy efficiency will not only help to mitigate the 
causes of climate change, but will also shorten logistical supply lines (thus freeing up units for 
combat operations), and deprive illiberal oil-rich regimes and the terrorists they support of 
funding.[42]  
As the 2010 QDR states, the DoD will increase the rate at which energy efficient technologies 
reach end users.[43] These technologies include solar powered military mobile command centers 
which use a combination of solar power, improved fuel cells and batteries, and new quantum 
dots and other semi-conductor technologies that improve solar panel efficiency on vehicles and 
bases.[44] In addition, the Environmental Security and Technology Certification Program uses 
military installations as a test bed for innovative technologies coming from DoD and Department 
of Energy laboratories and the private sector.[45] The DoD has invested in non-carbon power 
sources such as solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass energy at domestic installations and in 
vehicles powered by alternative fuels, including hybrid power, electricity, hydrogen, and 
compressed natural gas. The Nellis Air Force base, with its 140-acre solar array, serves as 
another sterling example of what the military is doing to cut down on its greenhouse gas 
emissions.[46] By 2016, the Air Force will be positioned to use 50 percent of its aviation fuel via 
an alternative fuel blend that is greener than conventional petroleum fuel. This will eventually 
pave the way for commercial aviation to follow.[47]  
Though these programs should be applauded, there is still much to be done. These disparate 
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programs will need to be synthesized into an integrated energy strategy under the DoD’s Director 
of Operational Energy Plans and Programs.[48] By cutting down on energy consumption and 
moving toward renewable and hybrid forms of energy, the military will “ultimately address the 
long-standing irony of fueling our defense establishment from a system that threatens our 
nation’s security.”[49] Energy efficiency will also serve as a “force multiplier” by reducing the 
number of combat forces diverted to protecting energy supply lines, which are vulnerable to both 
conventional attacks and disruptions.[50] 
Towards a Conclusion: Dealing with the Uncertain Future 
For some, securing the planet’s climate may continue to sit uncomfortably with traditional 
threats (most notably peer competition from rising states) and the new nontraditional threats 
(rogue nations and terrorism) to national security. As discussed earlier, part of this discomfort 
comes from a tradition of seeing national security threats as issues of violence from outside the 
state, and as seeing these issues as separate from issues of global justice and political institution 
building. As skeptics would rightly note, the most important steps toward mitigating the causes 
of climate change reside outside of purview of the security community—in the realm of domestic 
policy and international diplomacy. Thus, from this view, following up on the Copenhagen 
Accords, moving toward an international cap and trade system, and restructuring the nation’s 
energy infrastructure should be the most vital initiatives, not adding another issue to the already 
bloated plate of security practitioners.  
However, as this essay has attempted to show, such easy separations between domestic policy, 
international diplomacy, and national security no longer make sense. Though climate change has 
previously been neglected as a national security concern, security planners are now starting to 
conceive of innovative programs for dealing with both the causes of climate change and its 
potential dire effects. One of the key areas the DoD will need to focus on—energy efficiency and 
innovations in energy efficient technologies—should be the least controversial since it also 
overlaps with key strategic goals in the war on terror. Even for those skeptical of climate change, 
it is clear that an energy efficient military will deprive illiberal states of support and starve the 
terrorist networks they support of resources,[51] also freeing the United States of dependence 
from other countries.   
This is not to argue that climate change politics—or even technological change or climate change 
research—needs to be militarized; but rather, that securing the world’s climate should be a 
security priority on par with countering nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and rogue regimes. 
Though some would prefer to keep the categories of environment and security separate, the 
language of security is essential for mobilizing public attention and support. In the end, however, 
the foundation of an effective climate security strategy will remain an international carbon 
regime that limits the emissions of the most polluting powers through a carbon cap and trading 
system. While much of the impetus lies in foreign policy maneuvering, the elevated position 
climate security now shares—and should continue to share—with other threats to national 
security should go a long way toward legitimizing more stringent efforts to limit greenhouse 
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emissions both domestically and internationally.  
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